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ABSTRACT
The nations of the world increasingly are conducting business collectively,
through international organizations. Intelligence services, traditionally
focused on serving the needs of single nations, are being called upon to
work within a larger international framework and to cooperate with coun-
terpart services in pursuit of shared objectives. Decisions about sharing
intelligence information present special difficulties and dilemmas when
they must involve international organizations. This article traces the evolu-
tion of intelligence sharing policies - largely from a US perspective - and
offers some proposed guidelines for making more effective use of intelli-
gence in a multilateral context.
In the abstract, intelligence is most valuable when it is unique-
ly available to only one person (or group or government). But it is
only useful when it is made available to the person (or group or
government) who can use it to change the course of history. This
contradiction is the basic dilemma underlying all discussions
about the sharing of intelligence - within governments, between
governments, and within multinational organizations.
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Knowledge is power, and attempts to restrict its availability
come naturally to those who delight in control. In the intelligence
business, this tendency shows itself in ludicrous ways. For exam-
ple, US President Harry Truman asked the Central Intelligence
Group (CIG) to create a Daily Summary of incoming information
for his consumption. Then he had to force the Secretary of State
to give the necessary State Department cables to the CIG. To this
day, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) struggles for access to
the information considered most valuable and most sensitive by
the other elements of the US Government that control the data,
while the CIA also insists on maintaining tight control over a huge
share of the material it collects. Thus sharing is not something that
comes naturally to intelligence officers.
These problems become more and more difficult to deal with
as the universe of potential sharers grows. It is one with which all
intelligence services must struggle and one that confronts them
with special difficulties as international organizations are increas-
ingly becoming major actors on the international scene.
The following comments are based primarily on my two-year
experience supporting the US Mission to the United Nations,
which involved me in issues relating to the sharing of information
with UN elements and helping them to improve their procedures
for using and protecting such information. My prior background
for the assignment encompassed 30 years spent producing and
delivering US finished intelligence products to US customers and
overseeing clearance of analytic work for sharing with other gov-
ernments. My purpose is to delineate some general principles that
I believe need to be understood as proposed international shar-
ing arrangements are considered.
World War II and the Cold War
Most modern intelligence services are products of World War
II and the Cold War, and the early decisions they made about
sharing intelligence across nations grew out of military alliances
against a common enemy. The US/UK “special relationship” and
the broader cooperative arrangements involving the US, the UK,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand were created in the early
1940s and became stronger and more complex with the passage
of time. The US and the USSR also exchanged intelligence
throughout the war. After the war, the Soviet Union became the
leader of a competitive network, with strong central direction from
Moscow and with the East European members playing specialized
roles. The heads of the British, French and West German services
also met regularly to share information on topics of common
interest. (deMarenches & Andelman 1992, pp. 218-222;



























In addition, intelligence services of “third world” countries
were trained, nurtured, and brought into sharing relationships by
“first” and “second” world sponsors who saw them as potential
Cold War allies. The Arab countries shared intelligence with one
another on Israel. The Israelis maintained strong contacts with
France and formed a trilateral sharing arrangement with Iran and
Turkey; they also shared intelligence about the Arabs bilaterally
with many of the African countries. Similar intelligence sharing
networks of varying degrees of closeness formed in clusters of
nations that were pro- or anti- China, North Korea, etc.
(deMarenches & Andelman 1992; Richelson 1990, Westerfield
1996)
As NATO and the Warsaw Pact grew into formal military
organizations, intelligence elements were a natural development,
and decisions had to be made about how to handle information
collected by individual members within a multinational structure.
All sorts of elaborate systems for sharing and compartmenting
intelligence evolved - usually based on the nationalities of the
individuals involved. Because these were elaborate military struc-
tures, their operations were highly codified and documented in
great detail. 
The underlying themes of these sharing relationships, whether
bilateral or multilateral, were:
 the enemy of my enemy is my friend; and
 no sharing of intelligence about friends with other friends.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact, however, these simple guidelines were not very useful. Who
was the enemy? Who was the friend? And in any event the
prospect of military conflict across national borders was no longer
the central concern of most governments. Thus there were new
issues about what to share, as well as with whom.
The Last Decade
By the end of the 1980s there were a number of subjects on
which the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries had common inter-
ests - for example countering proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, deterring the flow of illicit drugs, countering terrorism,
promoting peaceful resolution of international and civil conflict,
and ensuring the safety of nuclear materials. These were not top-
ics that could be addressed effectively in a purely military frame-
work or on a national or regional basis. They demanded a truly
international effort. New models were needed.
Concurrently, the end of the Cold War witnessed a revitaliza-
tion of the United Nations. Suddenly the United States and Russia
found common ground and began to cooperate at the UN, espe-






























permanent members of the Council - and the reluctant acquies-
cence of the Chinese - UN peacekeeping missions proliferated. In
1994 almost 80,000 troops were serving in over 20 UN missions
around the world. And they had begun to draw on UN member
countries for intelligence to support those peacekeeping missions.
The numbers are smaller now - about 14,000 personnel in 17
operations in the autumn of 1999, but the need for intelligence
continues (Washington Post, November 13, 1999)
The US-Russia coincidence of views had particular relevance
in the Middle East, which had long been an area for conflict
between them. The two countries worked together to end the Iran-
Iraq war, and the Russians were vigorously and vocally opposed
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They worked closely with their erst-
while NATO antagonists to develop and implement UN sanctions
against Iraq and a UN regime intended to eliminate Iraq’s poten-
tial for the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and
they contributed personnel to the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) set up in 1991 to enforce that regime.
The Russians also cooperated with the US and other nations
to enforce economic sanctions against several other countries,
including Yugoslavia and Libya. And Moscow backed UN human-
itarian missions - sometimes even with resources. Indeed, US-
Russian mutual tolerance has even survived the breakup of
Yugoslavia and the subsequent dispatch of UN and NATO mis-
sions to several areas of “greater Yugoslavia.” And US and
Russian troops are serving side by side in Kosovo, albeit not with-
out periodic misunderstandings and frictions.
Intelligence at the UN
However, one judges the overall effectiveness of the UN and
its agencies in peacekeeping, sanctions enforcement, arms con-
trol, stopping genocide and dealing with humanitarian emergen-
cies Intelligence information provided by member countries, as
well as information developed by UN entities and by non-govern-
ments organizations (NGOs), has played a positive role. But the
idea of sharing intelligence between national governments and
the UN has required a seismic shift in attitudes and practices on
all sides. 
For the UN as an organization, even admitting to using intel-
ligence has been difficult and distasteful. The UN has long main-
tained that it does not engage in intelligence operations and has
preferred to refer only to its information needs.
In deference to UN sensibilities, both Canadian and US mili-
tary directives instruct their personnel engaged in UN peacekeep-
ing operations to keep their terminology in line with UN prefer-



























to be involved with peacekeeping because it might tarnish their
own humanitarian images.
Nonetheless, every UN Secretary General has expressed a
need for better information for strategic decision making, and the
UN investigation of attacks on UN personnel in Somalia conclud-
ed that, “The need to satisfy the UN’s requirement for reliable
information and intelligence gathering capability is important if
peace enforcement operations are to be successfully carried out.”
A study produced by the UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia) argued
strongly that peacekeeping against active opposition demands an
intelligence function (Ramsbotham 1995, p. 162; Johnston 1997,
pp.103-4).
A Situation Centre was established within the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in April of 1993. It operates
around the clock, includes representation from the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, and has a limited analytic capability. It also
has acquired the US-developed Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support System (JDISS), which has greatly improved its theoretical
ability to communicate with UN field elements and with any other
country that has the same equipment. In fact, with personnel
assigned to the Centre by their own governments for limited tours
and with little technical training, the ability to use JDISS and other
sophisticated systems has been limited (Ramsbotham 1995, pp.
169-171).
Every UN peacekeeping operation for the last decade or so
has had intelligence elements, usually integrated into the nation-
al contingents, and most have developed multinationally-staffed
headquarters elements as well. Enough experience has accumu-
lated to generate a substantial military intelligence literature on
intelligence support to peacekeeping operations in the US.  After-
action studies of US participation in operations such as Somalia,
Haiti and Bosnia have concluded that human source intelligence
often is more critical to success than the high-technology systems
on which the US military tends to rely, and that other countries
often are more effective than the US in gathering human source
information. Academic observers also stress the importance of
intelligence shortcomings at the operational, as opposed to the
strategic, level. (Pickert 1997; Eriksson 1997, p. 1-6; Smith 1994,
pp. 176-177; Johnston 1997, pp. 109-110).
The US has been more vocal than other UN members in pub-
licly acknowledging the role of intelligence in making the UN
more effective. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in
September 1992, President Bush urged the UN members to take
a number of steps to strengthen the UN including developing its
planning, crisis management and intelligence capabilities. His
January 1993 National Security Strategy Paper declared that, “US





























as assisting the international organizations like the United Nations
when called upon in support of crucial peacekeeping, humanitar-
ian assistance and arms control efforts. We will share information
and assets that strengthen peaceful relationships and aid in build-
ing confidence,” (Pickert 1997, p. 407; Smith 1994, p. 184).
The Clinton Administration adopted the same thrust; it set out
in 1993 to develop a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on
multilateral peacekeeping operations that would lay out a for-
ward-leaning US policy on participation in peacekeeping, includ-
ing provision of intelligence information. Enthusiasm for the UN is
not universal in US political circles, however; to some, particular-
ly in Congress, cooperation with the UN is “incredibly naive” and
“caving in to one-world government.” Considerable controversy
ensued over the conditions and command arrangements under
which US military personnel could be committed to UN peace-
keeping operations. The PDD finally unveiled in May 1994 said,
inter alia, that the US would support stronger UN planning, logis-
tics, information and command and control capabilities. It rec-
ommended reorganization of DPKO to include separate divisions
for plans, information and research, operations, and logistics
(Pickert 1997, pp. 395-431; McKinnon, 1999, pp. 32-54).
These recommendations served to codify changes already
made by DPKO, with US encouragement, while the PDD was
being debated. The US provided personnel and equipment to
support the Situation Centre and establish the information and
research element, and it provided a stream of intelligence-based
information, duly sanitized by the intelligence organizations pro-
viding it and funnelled through the Defense Intelligence Agency,
to support several specific operations and to facilitate planning for
possible future peacekeeping and humanitarian operations
(Pickert 1997, pp. 440-445).
Nor are peacekeeping efforts the only UN activities receiving
US intelligence. Monitors overseeing UN-imposed economic
sanctions depend heavily on information provided by govern-
ments supporting the sanctions effort. Information derived from
imagery has played a key role in detecting and documenting
genocide in Rwanda/Burundi, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and it pre-
sumably will play a critical role as evidence in the war crimes tri-
als to come. Imagery-derived maps and related reports have
greatly improved the timeliness and effectiveness of UN relief
operations on many occasions. The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees also has been the recipient of a considerable volume of
information (US State Dept. 1996; Pickert 1997, pp. 75-98;
Constantine 1995, p.13; NYTimes June 10, 1999).
Of course, many other UN member countries also share intel-
ligence with the UN in one fashion or another, most often through


























UN. UN elements share information with each other, with specific
member nations, and with NGOs. Some of the most valuable
information is available from civilians and officials caught up in
the conflict, disaster or genocide in question, although this infor-
mation is not sought as systematically as could be wished
(Eriksson 1997, pp. 9-10).
To date, the most intensive use of governmentally-supplied
information has been made by UNSCOM. In creating UNSCOM,
the Security Council agreed to unprecedented intrusive measures
against a sovereign member state. Over time, as the Iraqis
stonewalled inspection efforts, UNSCOM evolved into a complex
organization devoted to uncovering Iraq’s concealment activities.
The US provided the U-2 planes that produced reconnaissance
photos for UNSCOM. UNSCOM relied heavily on intelligence
inputs from the US, the UK, Israel - and presumably many others
of the countries that were former arms suppliers to Iraq and
actively supported the UNSCOM effort. Difficulties arose, howev-
er, because providers of information were not willing to discuss
sources, and failures to find suspected materials undermined con-
fidence in the accuracy of information. As of this writing, detailed
arrangements for a successor organization apparently have not
been formalized, but clearly its success will depend in no small
measure on access to intelligence from national governments
(Wise 1999; Washington Post September 29, 1998; NYTimes
January 17, 1999; Kay 1997; Ritter 1999).
The US has developed elaborate formal procedures for pro-
viding intelligence to the UN, but no clear-cut rules have yet been
formulated about how the broader network of relationships works.
Each new case is unique, and the procedures have to be worked
out laboriously in light of specific circumstances. But perhaps
some generalizations drawn from my observations of recent US
intelligence relationships with the UN will be useful in thinking
about intelligence sharing in and with the UN and other interna-
tional organizations in the 21st Century.
Increasing Effective Use of Intelligence in International
Organizations
It is difficult, but not impossible, for a country or its leadership
to behave so badly that even the most fissiparous international
organization will unite in opposition. Iraq’s behavior toward
Kuwait and toward its own citizens permitted - almost demanded
- virtually unanimous support for economic sanctions and the
UNSCOM regime that lasted for almost eight years. Every time the
competing national interests of the permanent members of the
Security Council seemed to be leading to limits on UNSCOM, the
Iraqis said or did something to destroy their opportunity. Milosevic






























the Balkans. The horrors of the slaughter in Rwanda and Burundi
made it impossible for the world to stand aside. And it is the unity
of purpose engendered by outlaw behavior that makes nations
willing to share even some quite sensitive intelligence information
in new and different ways.
The UN has traditionally refused to provide information on the
activities of its member states to one another. But this makes it
almost impossible for the UN to disseminate information to its
field elements and operations about arms flows, financial support,
movement of materials relevant to weapons of mass destruction
and a host of other topics that are fundamental to enforcing sanc-
tions. The larger the international organization involved, the less
it can afford to eschew sharing information on its member states
with others who are working to ensure compliance. 
Much of the information necessary to support a humanitarian
operation or a peacekeeping mission is not really sensitive. In
either case, information on ports, roads, airports, railroads,
telecommunications, population concentrations, the normal flows
of goods and services, medical facilities, epidemiologic informa-
tion, geography and climate is essential. But trying to assemble
such information after an emergency has begun is time consum-
ing and difficult; moreover, that information may suddenly
become sensitive, while a periodic request to all members for the
same elements of information should not inspire the same protec-
tive reactions. In fact, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs recently has begun to assemble and share
such information through a system known as ReliefWeb. Any inter-
national organization should assemble and periodically update a
comprehensive data base on all its members, based on their con-
tributions, as a hedge against the need for humanitarian opera-
tions before any such operations are contemplated. Not coinci-
dentally, much of this information will prove to be useful for peace
operations and sanctions enforcement as well.
The need for intelligence assistance is greatest when an inter-
national organization is undertaking preventive diplomacy or
beginning to plan a new operation; after deployment, the field
operation often can generate much of the information it needs.
The US traditionally was reluctant to agree to share information
with the UN until the Security Council had made a decision in
favor of such an operation; now, however, it provides information
on basic infrastructure in advance of such decisions and periodic
briefings on crisis areas worldwide. The UN, for its part, has been
reluctant to move beyond passive receipt of information to even
such minimal active collection efforts as asking questions - espe-
cially questions on political and military factors. Thus the decision
to deploy peacekeepers or sanctions monitors or a relief opera-


























the planning process is hobbled. Member states should strive to
provide as much intelligence as possible to an international
organization before an irreversible commitment is made, and a
structure should be in place for accomplishing this. The UN
should begin actively collecting information to support operations
of all kinds, emphasizing non-sensitive information from former
colonial powers, neighbors, and other countries that can be
expected to be knowledgeable.
In most international organizations, responsibility for assem-
bling intelligence information will fall to military personnel. They
are available in much greater numbers than their civilian counter-
parts, have communications resources, can be ordered around at
will, and are accustomed to operating in international environ-
ments. But many of the missions carried out by international
organizations will be humanitarian and/or economic in nature,
and they are likely to have important political dimensions as well
(Quiggin 1998, p. 205). Thus military intelligence officers will
increasingly be expected to understand and use information that
has not heretofore been classified as “military intelligence.”
When an international organization is engaged in military
operations, it needs adequate military representation of its mem-
bers, as well as a strong military element in its own headquarters.
A Military Staff Committee - with military representatives from
each of its members - was provided for in the UN Charter. It still
meets, but it took its last substantive action in 1948 (Ramsbotham
1995, p. 168). That Committee should be given new life, and any
international organization that expects to engage in military or
quasi-military operations should have a strong military staff struc-
ture capable of detailed planning and risk assessment prior to the
initiation of operations.
Large and long-lived multinational organizations eventually
develop a cadre of permanent personnel. Many of them owe their
primary allegiance to the organization, rather than the country of
their birth. Some individuals have, in fact, left their native coun-
tries to escape persecution or because of political differences with
the existing government. Some have closer ties to some other
country than their own. Neither nationality nor country of birth can
be trusted to be a reliable guide to judge whether intelligence
information can safely be shared.
The larger the international organization, the less likely it is
that sensitive information can be protected for any length of time.
It is rarely practical to allocate jobs so as to control access to data.
In some cases, information can be shared orally with one or two
individuals without fear of compromise. But it is generally wise to
assume that information given to an international organization is






























Individuals working with and for international organizations
are most likely to handle information sensibly in the short run
when it is in their self-interest to do so. Peacekeepers or humani-
tarian operations officials in a situation of danger have every rea-
son to protect information from those who may shoot at them;
they also have good reason to share it with NGO representatives;
the latter often can provide information of equal or greater value.
Personnel enforcing economic sanctions will try to protect infor-
mation that promises to enhance their success and consequent
compensation. Moreover, much of this tactical information has
value only for hours or days. Failure to share information was a
major source of the problems that befell the US-led Somalia oper-
ation (Smith 1994, p.178). In an operational situation, decisions
about intelligence sharing must be made in the field, not at head-
quarters.
Intelligence from technical sources is inherently more believ-
able than intelligence from human sources. It also is often less vul-
nerable to compromise, at least in conditions of low-intensity con-
flict. Technologies once unique to intelligence are increasingly
available on the commercial market - for example, West German
contractors are collecting land-based imagery in Kosovo on
behalf of the war crimes tribunal. Satellite data is available com-
mercially from both the French and the Russians, as well as the
US-owned Ikonos satellite launched in September 1999
(Washington Post, July 18, 1999 & September 25, 1999; Smith
1994, p. 185). There may be circumstances in which it would be
worthwhile for the UN to buy or lease unmanned aerial vehicles
for reconnaissance purposes. Every effort should be made to max-
imize use and sharing of technically-based information.
Senior officials who do not come from intelligence-rich envi-
ronments tend to have exaggerated expectations of what even the
most sophisticated intelligence systems can provide. They ask for
the moon and believe that someone is holding out on them if the
moon is not delivered in short order. This problem stems partly
from the grandiose descriptions in the press of various intelligence
capabilities and partly from the fact that intelligence systems may
be worldwide without being equally capable in all geographic
areas and weather conditions. Because information on the capa-
bilities and limitations of intelligence systems is inevitably sensitive,
this problem can be ameliorated but not solved. Early and fre-
quent communication with the senior officials of an international
organization or operation about what can realistically be expect-
ed can help.
Analytic intelligence products shorn of their evidentiary base
are not likely to be accepted at face value by multinational organ-
izations if they conflict with conventional wisdom or support one


























intelligence, is viewed skeptically as potentially biased by nation-
al policy interests. If the products are of sufficient importance to
justify sharing, they should be released to the international organ-
ization with as much supporting data as possible.
Realistically, however, member nations will find it difficult to
share analytic judgments, or supporting evidence, that reflects
badly on other friendly governments or on their own earlier behav-
ior. Moreover, the analytic perspective of the international organ-
ization will necessarily differ from a purely national one. Any inter-
national organization that has a need for intelligence, including
the UN, also has a need for an analytic element to serve its sen-
ior officials and provide both the organizational leadership and
the member states with an overview that supplements the nation-
al views put forth by members (UNA/USA, 1997; Kay 1997).
Tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) is essential to peace-
keeping operations and can also make a significant contribution
to humanitarian operations, sanctions enforcement, arms control
regimes, and many other activities in which international organi-
zations engage. In much of the third world, neither the techniques
nor the technology in use are particularly difficult or sensitive,
although this is constantly changing. Every international organiza-
tion that intends to engage in such operations, including the UN,
should develop and maintain an integral tactical SIGINT capabil-
ity and adequate on-call reserves. Peacekeeping units can, of
course, be expected to bring their own SIGINT resources to any
mission.
Technology can be a blessing or a curse in international
organizations. In the Persian Gulf War, the collection systems were
superb, but US forces suffered from incompatible dissemination
systems across the military services. On an international level, this
problem is far greater. And it is compounded by differing training
and skill levels of personnel from a variety of nations, operating in
a variety of languages. International organizations need to keep
their systems as simple as possible and to select equipment and
develop procedures for use by the least educated and talented of
their contingents. They need to pay continual attention to training
personnel to make the most of such systems. Members should
agree to leave personnel in place for extended periods; working
in an international environment is harder than working in a
national one.
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